Ted Carstensen, the CEO of the U.S. Digital Service, resigned from the fork-in-the-road

Ted was the highest-ranking official outside of Musk’s staff and resigned on Thursday. He repeatedly invited members of Musk’s team, including DOGE senior adviser Steve Davis, to join staff meetings, sources tell WIRED, but they never showed. Two sources said that Carstensen was left out of leadership meetings and kept out of the loop on decision making. Carstensen was supposed to meet with Holmes on Wednesday, a source said, but the meeting was canceled last minute.

Carstensen’s decision to refuse the “fork” deal echoes a similar sentiment held among the broader USDS staff. The source said that people don’t want to send a signal that they’re accepting or approving of the larger plan, because they don’t want to.

“This was not an easy decision for me to make as my time at the US Digital Service has been one of the best periods in my career. I believe wholeheartedly in the mission and have been inspired every day by the commitment, kindness, and intelligence of the team,” Carstensen wrote. “It was important for me to get the team to a place where everyone could choose their own path forward, which is where we find ourselves today. I hope each of you lands on the path that’s best for you, and I look forward to staying in touch and seeing where it takes you.”

In a resignation email viewed by WIRED, Carstensen confirmed that Thursday would be his final day. He said that he would not be taking the deferred resignation offer that has colloquially been called “the fork” after the Fork in the Road email federal workers received last week offering them continued pay and benefits through September 30.

Will Musk and the Treasury be able to communicate securely with the public? A WIRED perspective on Musk’s contributions to DOGE and his association with the bureau of fiscal service

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Although Treasury and White House officials have repeatedly denied it, WIRED has reported that DOGE technologists had the ability to not only read the code of sensitive payment systems but also rewrite it. A young man with little to no government experience, but associated with the group DOGE, was granted read and write privileges on two of the most sensitive systems in the US government.

Without new directives, USDS sources tell WIRED they’ve been operating as if things are “business as usual,” continuing work on long-term projects that have carried over from President Joe Biden’s administration.

A source tells WIRED that they clearly do not give a fuck about us. We wait for them to come, and they don’t.

The Department of Government Efficiency has built a “firewall” separating Elon Musk’s team from the 200 or so legacy workers employed by what was previously called the United States Digital Service (USDS), sources tell WIRED.

In a letter to Treasury secretary Scott Bessent on February 7, Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon said that “Treasury’s refusal to provide straight answers about DOGE’s actions, as well as its refusal to provide a briefing requested by several Senate committees only heightens my suspicions” and requested that Bessent provide the logs of Elez and any other DOGE-affiliated personnel regarding their access to the Treasury’s systems.

Elez was previously employed by both Musk’s space company and his social media company. The Wall Street Journal inquired about Elez’s connections to a deleted social media account that advocated for racism and Eugenics. Elez did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

DOGE Employees have no clue what insider threats are inside the Treasury? A response to the Treasury Department Insider Threat Threat Intelligence Team

The email also details this week’s Treasury lawsuit, which resulted in a federal judge granting an order on February 6 to temporarily restrict DOGE staffers from accessing and altering payment system information.

Hundreds of staffers received recommendations in a weekly report from the BFS threat intelligence team. The threat intelligence team usually covers inside threat risks. “But they have never identified something inside the bureau as an insider threat risk that I know of.”